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ABSTRACT 
In Ireland, approximately 30 per cent of the population (“medical card patients”) are entitled to 
free GP care while the remaining 70 per cent (“private patients”) must pay the full cost of each 
visit. While previous research has analysed the effect of this system on GP visiting patterns using 
regression methods, to date, no attempt has been made to apply techniques from the treatment 
evaluation literature to this issue. Treatment evaluation techniques are commonly employed when 
observations are not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups; this is certainly the case 
here, as the primary criterion for medical card eligibility is an income below a specified income 
threshold (and individuals may also be granted medical cards for other reasons such as chronic 
ill-health). In this paper, we extend previous Irish research, which has analysed the effect of 
medical card eligibility on GP visiting using regression methods, to consider the use of 
difference-in-difference matching methods, which allow us to control for non-random selection 
into treatment and control groups, as well as unobserved differences in characteristics between 
individuals in both groups. The results are largely consistent with earlier results using pooled 
cross-sectional and panel data, and confirm that medical card eligibility exerts a significant effect 
on GP visiting, even after controlling for observed and unobserved differences in characteristics 




In Ireland, approximately 30 per cent of the population (medical card patients) are entitled to free 
GP care, while the remaining 70 per cent (private patients) must pay the full cost. Eligibility for a 
medical card is primarily decided on the basis of an income means test, but individuals may also 
be granted a medical card on the basis of age (since July 2001, all over 70s are automatically 
entitled to a medical card), particular health needs or participation in certain Government-
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sponsored employment and training schemes. Previous research in Ireland using regression 
methods has confirmed that even after controlling for differences in socio-economic and health 
status characteristics between medical card and private patients, medical card patients have 
significantly higher GP visiting rates than private patients (see Tussing, 1983 and 1985, Nolan, 
1991 and 1993, Madden et al., 2005, Nolan, 2006 and Nolan and Nolan, 2006). The purpose of 
this paper is to extend previous research on the effect of medical card eligibility on GP visiting by 
applying techniques from the treatment evaluation literature to this issue. A further extension is 
afforded by the use of longitudinal data, which allows us to follow the same individuals through 
time (and thereby compare those who change their medical card status over the period with those 
who do not).  
 
The evaluation problem is essentially one of missing data; individuals are either in the treatment 
group or control group, but never both. Constructing the counterfactual is thus the central 
problem facing those involved in the evaluation of a particular treatment, i.e., how would an 
individual behave if they had not received the treatment? Ideally, we would like experimental 
data, whereby individuals are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups. Then 
averaging over the full sample will give an unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment. 
However, the costs and ethical considerations surrounding experimental studies mean that they 
are rarely employed (an exception was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the USA in 
the 1970s where individuals were randomly assigned to a number of different health insurance 
plans, which differed in the degree to which co-payments were levied on the use of various health 
services; see Keeler, 1992). In this paper, we use the propensity score matching method, which 
matches treatment and control observations that are similar in terms of observed characteristics, 
and thereby produces unbiased estimates of the effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest. 
Matching estimators have been widely applied in labour economics, in particular in the 
evaluation of labour market initiatives such as employment and training schemes (see for 
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example, Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heckman et al., 1999, Conniffe et al., 2000, Bryson et al., 
2002 and Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2003). 
 
The standard means of isolating the independent effect of treatment is to control for observable 
differences between treated and control observations using regression methods. However, the 
imposition of functional form assumptions, as well as the possibility of insufficient common 
support (i.e., for any set of values of the independent variables, there may be insufficient numbers 
of both treated and control observations) means that such methods are not without problems (see 
LaLonde, 1986). Alternative solutions to the sample selection problem such as the Heckman 
sample selection estimator or the use of instrumental variables estimation rely heavily on the 
identification of suitable instruments, i.e., variables that affect the probability of receiving the 
treatment, but not the subsequent outcome of interest. In our case, it is difficult to identify a factor 
that would be correlated with receipt of a medical card, but unrelated to the use of GP services. 
For this reason, we concentrate in this paper on the application of matching methods to the 
evaluation of the effect of medical card status on GP visiting patterns.  
 
Matching methods match treatment and control observations on the basis of observable 
characteristics only, i.e., it is assumed that there are no unobservable differences in characteristics 
between treatment and control observations. In this paper, we exploit the fact that we have 
longitudinal data from 1995 to 2001 inclusive by combining matching methods with a difference-
in-difference estimator (see Heckman et al., 1998, Görg and Strobl, 2005 and Aassve et al., 
2006). Such an approach controls for unobserved time-invariant differences in characteristics 
between treatment and control observations and as such, provides a more reliable estimate of the 
effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest. Essentially, we compare the outcomes of 
individuals who are similar pre-treatment, but who differ only in their exposure to the treatment. 
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By first differencing our outcome measure, we also control for time-invariant unobservable 
differences between treatment and control observations.  
 
Section 2 provides more detail on medical card eligibility in Ireland, and previous research in the 
area. Section 3 describes the methodology employed, while Section 4 introduces the data set and 
explains how the treatment and control groups are constructed. Section 5 discusses empirical 
results and Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2 CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
While the majority of those who are granted a medical card qualify on the basis on an income 
means test, individuals may also qualify on the basis of age, particular health needs and 
participation in approved Government training and employment schemes. The income thresholds 
for a medical card are set nationally and updated annually in line with inflation. In 2001 (the 
latest period for which we have data), the weekly income thresholds for a medical card were 
€126.97 for a single person, €183.47 for a married couple and €229.19 for a married couple with 
two children aged 16 years or younger. The limits increase for those aged 66 years and over (e.g. 
for a married couple the limit increases to €205.69).1 From 1 July 2001, all individuals aged 70 
years and over are also entitled to a medical card, regardless of income. In special circumstances 
(e.g. those who contracted Hepatitis C directly or indirectly from the use of contaminated blood 
products administered by the state), an individual who is otherwise ineligible on the basis of 
income or age may be granted a medical card. Finally, individuals who previously held a medical 
card but who participate in various Government approved training and employment schemes 
(designed to encourage the long-term employed and economically inactive to enter into 
employment) are allowed to retain their medical card for a period following their entry onto these 
schemes (the maximum period is four years). Individuals apply to their local Health Service 
                                                 
1 The average gross weekly industrial wage in March 2001 was €447.32 (Central Statistics Office, 2005). 
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Executive Area for a medical card. Medical card patients receive all public health services free of 
charge, including GP consultations and prescribed medicines. The remainder of the population 
must pay in full for each GP consultation, and for all prescribed medicines up to a monthly limit 
(€53 in 2001). 
 
The proportion of the population with a medical card has fallen consistently over the 1990s, as a 
result of rising employment and average earnings. For the period under review in this paper 
(1995-2001), the proportion of the population with a medical card fell from 35.5 per cent to 31.2 
per cent (General Medical Services Payments Board, various issues). However, it is unclear what 
proportion of those with a medical card qualify for reasons other than income or age (see 
Comhairle, 2004).2 Much recent discussion has focussed on this fall in the numbers granted a 
medical card, and the failure of the income guidelines to rise in line with average earnings. In part 
in response to these concerns, the income thresholds for a medical card were raised substantially 
in October 2005, and a new “GP only” medical card introduced. The “GP only” medical card 
covers the cost of GP consultations only (i.e., not the associated prescription costs) and the 
income thresholds are now 50 per cent higher than those for the standard medical card. For this 
paper however, we are concerned only with the effect of eligibility for the standard medical card 
on GP visiting patterns.  
  
Previous research in Ireland has confirmed that there are significantly higher GP visiting rates 
among medical card patients, even after controlling for a variety of individual and household 
socio-economic and health status characteristics (see Tussing, 1983 and 1985, Nolan, 1991 and 
1993, Madden et al., 2005, Nolan, 2006 and Nolan and Nolan, 2006). Using the same data-set as 
we employ here, the average number of GP visits per annum for medical card and private patients 
(averaged over the period 1995-2001) was 6.5 and 2.4 respectively, an unadjusted difference of 
                                                 
2 In a 2004 parliamentary debate, the number was estimated at 70,000, which would account for 6.1 of those with 
medical cards in 2004 (Oireachtas Debates, 2 December 2004).  
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4.1 extra GP visits per annum on the part of medical card patients. Of course, medical card 
patients differ significantly from private patients in terms of many characteristics, most notably 
income and health status. Using various regression methods and the same data source that we use 
in this paper, the estimates of the effect of medical card eligibility on GP visiting range from 1.8 
extra GP visits per annum using pooled cross-section data from 1995-2001, to 1.5 extra GP visits 
per annum using pooled cross-section data from 19873, 1995 and 2001 (Madden et al., 2005). 
Using longitudinal data, which distinguishes between current and permanent medical card 
eligibility and allows us to control for observed as well as unobserved variation in characteristics 
across the population, the effects are 0.3 and 0.6 extra GP visits per annum for current and 
permanent medical card eligibility respectively (Nolan, 2006). The difference in financial 
incentives between medical card patients, who face only the time and travel costs of GP visits, 
and private patients, who must also pay for the consultation out of pocket, clearly contributes to 
these results.4  
 
3 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
In this paper, we use a propensity score matching approach to estimate the effect of medical card 
eligibility on GP visiting. In the absence of experimental data, the essential problem is one of 
sample selection; individuals who receive the treatment may be substantially different to those 
not receiving the treatment and thus standard regression estimation methods may produce biased 
estimates of the effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest. By matching treatment and 
control observations that are similar in terms of observed characteristics, the propensity score 
matching method produces unbiased estimates of the effect of the treatment (in our case, medical 
card status) on the outcome of interest (the number of GP visits per annum). However, standard 
                                                 
3 The 1987 Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services was conducted in a similar manner 
and contains similar information to that contained in the later 1995-2001 Living in Ireland Surveys (see also Section 
4). 
4 While GPs are reimbursed in different ways for medical card and private patients (capitation and fee-for-service 
respectively), this would not explain the difference in GP visiting levels (and a study on the influence of GP 
reimbursement on visiting differences between medical card and private patients in Ireland found no significant 
effect (Madden et al., 2005). 
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propensity score approaches cannot deal with the possibility that there may also be certain 
unobserved differences in characteristics between treatment and control observations (e.g., time 
preference rates, attitudes towards medical care, etc.). We therefore extend the standard 
propensity score approach to consider a difference-in-difference propensity score estimator, 
which takes first differences of the outcomes for the treated and control observations and thereby 
removes any variation in time-invariant unobserved characteristics between treatment and control 
observations. This assumes that treatment and control groups are affected in the same way by the 
same macro shocks between treatment and control periods, and that any unobservable differences 
in characteristics between treatment and control groups are constant over time and thus 
eliminated when we take first differences of the outcomes. This approach was first developed by 
Heckman et al., 1997 in an application analysing the labour market outcomes of participants in a 
training programme for disadvantaged workers and subsequently applied in a number of different 
contexts (see Blundell and Costas Dias, 2000, Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2003, Garcia 
Gomez and Lopez Nicolas, 2005, Görg and Strobl, 2005, Trujillo et al., 2005 and Aassve et al., 
2006).  
   
Assume that each individual i  has two potential outcomes,  (treatment, i.e., medical card) and 
 (control, i.e., private). The average effect of the treatment is given by . However, 
as we cannot observe  and  simultaneously for the same individual, we rely instead on the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET): 
1iY
0iY ( 0i1i YYE − )
)
0iY 1iY
( ) ( 1D|YE1D|YE i0ii1i =−=         (1) 
where  is the dichotomous indicator of treatment, with 1 indicating that individual  receives 
the treatment, and 0 otherwise. Of course, we need to identify the second part of expression (1). If 
we assume conditional independence between treatment and outcomes, i.e., given a set of 




outcomes would have been had they not been treated (selection occurs only on observable 
characteristics), then the following also holds: 
( ) ( ) 00D,X|YE1D,X|YE ii0iii0i ==−=        (2) 
and an unbiased estimate of the ATET can be obtained from: 
( ) ( )0D,X|YE1D,X|YE ii0iii1i =−=        (3) 
 
Due to the practical difficulties involved in matching observations when there are a large number 
of covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 showed that summarising the observed characteristics 
of each observation into a single index (the propensity score, i.e., the predicted probability of 
participation in the treatment) makes matching feasible (Becker and Ichino, 2002). We therefore 
first estimate the probability of receiving the treatment, conditional on a vector of pre-treatment 
characteristics X : 
( ) (XF1DP i == )           (4) 
where  is usually the cumulative standard normal distribution function (i.e., a probit model). 
Propensity score matching entails modelling the probability of participation, calculating the 
predicted probability of participation for each individual (the propensity score) and matching 
individuals with similar propensity scores.  
( ).F
 
As the probability of two observations having exactly the same propensity score is zero (as the 
propensity score variable is continuous), the comparison observation or group of observations for 
each treated observation is chosen according to various alternative measures of proximity (e.g., 
nearest neighbour, radius, kernel weights etc.). The essential difference between the various 
methods is the weight given to each control observation. Nearest neighbour matching entails 
finding a control observation with the closest propensity score for each treated observation. Once 
each treated observation is matched with a control observation, the difference in outcomes 
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between the treated and control observations is computed, and averaged over all observations to 
gain an estimate of the average treatment effect. However, a disadvantage of the nearest 
neighbour method is that while some matches may be poor (i.e., dissimilar propensity scores), 
they still contribute to the calculation of the average treatment effect. A variant of nearest 
neighbour matching is calliper matching, whereby a control observation with a propensity score 
falling within a specified range of the propensity score of a treated observation is considered a 
match. Hence, in moving from the nearest neighbour to the calliper method the quality of the 
matches is improved, but at a cost of fewer observations (Bryson et al., 2002). Nearest neighbour 
and calliper matching can be extended to allow for multiple matches for each treated observation, 
thus considering matches of a slightly poorer quality. Radius matching extends the calliper 
matching technique to consider all possible matches (i.e., not just nearest neighbour matches) 
within the specified range of the propensity score. The smaller the dimension of the radius, the 
stronger the possibility that some treated observations will not be treated but the better is the 
quality of the matches. With kernel matching, treated observations are matched with a weighted 
average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between 
propensity scores of treated and controls. This means that exact matches get a large weight, and 
poorer matches a smaller weight (Becker and Ichino, 2002).  
 
As we have longitudinal data, we can extend the standard analysis of treatment effects (i.e., in our 
application, the effect of having a medical card on GP visiting rates) by following the same 
individuals through time and analysing the effect of changing medical card status on the change 
in GP visiting patterns. In this paper, we therefore estimate the ATET for two transitions: gaining 
a medical card, and losing a medical card. To estimate the propensity score, we estimate a binary 
probit model of the probability of treatment, with various pre-treatment individual and household 
characteristics as explanatory variables (see Section 4). We then use nearest neighbour, radius 
and kernel matching methods to estimate the treatment effects for both transitions. For the nearest 
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neighbour method, we implement one-to-one matching (with and without calliper), and we also 
allow for multiple matches (again, with and without calliper). In all cases, we impose the 
common support condition, as this may improve the quality of the matches used to estimate the 
average treatment effect (Becker and Ichino, 2002), although in practice very few observations do 
not satisfy this condition. We also match with replacement, meaning that a control observation 
can be a match for more than one treated unit. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping, with 
50 iterations found to produce stable results. The models are all estimated using the PSMATCH2 
command in Stata Version 9.0  
 
4 DATA 
We use data from the Living in Ireland Survey, which was carried out by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI) and constitutes the Irish component of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP began in 1994 and ended in 2001. It involved an annual 
survey of a representative sample of private households and individuals aged 16 years and over in 
each EU member state, based on standardised individual and household questionnaires. In 
addition to information on a variety of individual socio-economic characteristics, the individual 
questionnaires also contain information on health services utilisation in the previous year (GP, 
specialist, dentist and optician visits as well as number of nights in hospital) and measures of the 
extent and nature of physical and psychological health problems. As the number of GP visits is 
not separately identified from the number of visits to medical specialists, dentists and opticians in 
1994, we confine our analysis to the years 1995 to 2001 inclusive.  
In constructing our treatment and control groups and periods, a complication is that while our GP 
visiting variable refers to the number of GP visits in the twelve months prior to the interview 
date, medical card status is recorded on the interview date. Therefore, it is possible that an 
individual could lose their medical card shortly before the interview date, yet their record of GP 
visiting would primarily refer to the period in which they had a medical card. For this reason, we 
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take a longer perspective than the standard two time periods, and construct treatment and control 
groups based on four years of data5, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. Treatment occurs sometime 
between t=2 and t=3. As we have at most seven years of data (1995-2001 inclusive), this means 
that we have four sequences of time periods (1995-1998, 1996-1999, 1997-2000, 1998-2001). We 
consider two sets of treatment and control groups: 
• those who gain a medical card over the period, in comparison with those who remain without 
a medical card over the period (i.e., PPMM vs. PPPP, where P refers to private patient and M 
refers to medical card patient) 
• those who lose a medical card over the period, in comparison with those who remain with a 
medical card over the period (i.e., MMPP vs. MMMM) 
In both cases, the outcome variable is the change in GP visits between t=4 and t=2 (as the former 
refers to GP visiting in the period between t=3 and t=4, and the latter refers to GP visiting in the 
period between t=1 and t=2). As the number of treatment observations for each sequence of 
years is small, and the estimated results are largely insignificant6, we pool the four time periods 
and base our discussion of empirical results on these estimates (see Section 5).  
 
[insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
We delete observations for which information on variables of interest are missing, as well as 
observations where GP visits in excess of 52 per annum were recorded.7 As we construct our 
treatment and control groups using four consecutive years of data, this necessarily reduces the 
sample sizes for estimation. The last three rows of Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the sample sizes for 
each matching procedure. As expected, the control groups are considerably larger than the 
                                                 
5 See Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2003) for a similar construction of treatment and control groups in the context 
of quantifying the effect of disability on labour market outcomes.  
6 Results are available on request from the author. 
7 The majority of missing observations are due to the fact that answers to the Generalised Health Questionnaire (used 
to construct the index of psychological distress) could not be elicited for observations that were interviewed by 
proxy. 
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treatment groups, and the treatment groups for the case of losing a medical card (i.e., MMPP) are 
larger than those for gaining a medical card (i.e., PPMM), consistent with trends in medical card 
eligibility at the aggregate level over the period (see also Section 2).  
 
We match observations on the basis of their estimated propensity score (see Section 3). The 
propensity score is calculated on the basis of pre-treatment characteristics, i.e., measured at t=1. 
The characteristics used in the calculation of the propensity score correspond to the 
demographic/socio-economic characteristics of the individual, as well as their observed health 
status. Age is represented by a categorical variable with six indicators of 10-year groups (age 16-
24, age 25-34, age 35-44, age 45-54, age 55-64, age 65+). Gender is represented by a dummy 
variable (female). Household location is summarised by a dummy variable (rural), which 
classifies individuals based on the location of their household (rural households are those that 
reside in open countryside or a village with 200-1,499 inhabitants while urban households are 
those that reside in towns with 1,500 or more inhabitants or in the major cities of Dublin, Cork, 
Galway, Waterford or Limerick). A four-category variable summarises the highest level of 
education obtained by the individual: primary level education (the reference category), lower 
second level (lower secondary), upper second level (upper secondary) and third level (third 
level). All individuals are classified into three mutually exclusive employment status groups, 
namely full- or part-time employees (employed), unemployed (unemployed) and students, retired, 
economically inactive and engaged in home duties (the reference category). We use a categorical 
indicator of present marital status that distinguishes between being married (married), separated 
or divorced (separated/divorced), widowed (widowed) and never married (the reference 
category). Income is real net household income in Irish pounds, adjusted for the size and 
composition of the household using equivalence scales (income). We also include a quadratic 
term (incsq) to capture possible non-linearities in the relationship between income and medical 
card eligibility. A binary variable (ill-health) identifying individuals who report that they suffer 
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from “any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability” is included. Scores 
from the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) are used to construct a dichotomous variable 
indicating psychological health status (stress). The GHQ contains twelve questions relating to 
psychological health status. For the six positive statements (e.g. “have you recently been able to 
concentrate on what you’re doing?”), a person scores one if they answer “less than usual” or 
“much less than usual” while for the six negative statements (e.g. “have you recently lost much 
sleep over worry?”), a person scores one if they answer “more than usual” or “much more than 
usual”. These scores are added up and anyone scoring above the conventional threshold of two is 
considered to be in psychological distress (see also Nolan, 1991).  
 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before discussing estimation results, Table 3 presents the average number of GP visits per annum 
for both transitions that we consider (i.e., gaining or losing a medical card). Using the pooled 
data, the statistics indicate that on average, the change in GP visiting is greater for treatment 
observations with little change in GP visiting patterns among control observations. In addition, 
the changes in annual GP visiting rates among treatment groups are in the direction expected, and 
of similar magnitudes. The propensity score method refines this comparison by only comparing 
outcomes for treatment and control observations that have similar propensity scores, using 
various proximity criteria (nearest neighbour, radius etc.). This ensures that we are comparing 
outcomes for observations that are similar in every observable respect expect their exposure to 
the treatment. 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
We start by presenting the results for the impact of gaining a medical card on GP visiting rates. 
The estimates from the probit model (presented in column (1) of Table 4), which are used to 
 14
calculate the propensity score, suggest that participation in the treatment (i.e., gaining a medical 
card) is significantly associated with a variety of pre-treatment characteristics including age, 
education level, labour force status, marital status, household equivalised income and health 
status. As the number of treatment observations for each individual sequence of years is small, 
we rely on the estimates from the pooled model (see column (1) in Table 4).8 The balancing 
property9 is not satisfied for the radius matching method so we concentrate on the estimates from 
the nearest neighbour and kernel matching methods.  
 
[insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
The nearest neighbour and kernel estimates of the ATET range from 0.9 to 1.3 extra GP visits per 
annum, and all estimates of the ATET are significant. As the pre-treatment average number of GP 
visits per annum for treated observations was approximately 3.3 GP visits (see Table 3), this 
means that the effect of gaining a medical card is to increase the annual number of GP visits by 
between approximately 27 per cent and 39 per cent per annum. While there are no clear criteria 
for choosing one method over another (see also Bryson et al., 2002), it is clear that the different 
methods involve trade-offs between the quality and quantity of the matches. For example, when 
we match within a defined calliper, the estimate from the nearest neighbour methods become 
more significant. Even when we increase the number of possible matches (i.e., increase k), the 
calliper method produces very similar results (ranging from 1.1 extra GP visits per annum to 1.3 
extra GP visits per annum). The kernel estimate is the same as that for the one-to-one nearest 
neighbour estimate within calliper, and this is consistent with the fact that all possible matches 
are considered but are weighted in accordance with the difference in propensity scores (i.e., exact 
                                                 
8 Separate estimates for each of the four sequences are available on request from the author. 
9 The balancing property ensures that there are no significant differences in the distribution of pre-treatment 
observable characteristics between matched treatment and control observations (i.e., that matched treatment and 
control observations are as similar as possible). The test is undertaken using the PSTEST command in Stata Version 
9.0. 
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matches are given a large weight, and poor matches a small weight). In effect, by increasing k and 
matching within calliper or by using the kernel method, we can consider a wider range of 
possible matches, yet control the quality of those matches. For this reason, we regard the 
estimates of the ATET from the nearest neighbour within calliper and kernel methods as most 
accurate.  
 
For those losing a medical card (i.e., MMPP vs. MMMM), we follow the same procedure in 
estimating the ATET. The estimation results from the binary probit model of participation in 
treatment are presented in column (2) of Table 4 and illustrate that losing a medical card is 
negatively related to age, rural location and ill-health but positively related to higher levels of 
education, being in the labour force and household income. Matching estimation results are 
presented in column (2) of Table 5. Once again, the balancing property is not satisfied when 
using the radius matching method, so we focus on the results using the nearest neighbour and 
kernel matching methods. The results, all of which are significant, range from 1.1 fewer GP visits 
per annum to 1.6 fewer GP visits per annum. As the pre-treatment average number of GP visits 
per annum for treated observations was approximately 3.3 GP visits per annum (see Table 3), this 
means that the effect of losing a medical card is to reduce the average number of annual GP visits 
by approximately 33-49 per cent.  
 
The effects are somewhat higher than those using the same data source and current panel data 
econometric techniques (see Nolan, 2006) but comparable with those from previous work using 
pooled cross-section data from the same source (see Madden et al., 2005). However, the added 
value of this research is that we can distinguish between those gaining and losing a medical card. 
Based on our data, the results indicate that the change in GP visiting behaviour is larger and more 
significant for those losing a medical card than for those gaining a medical card, suggesting that 
the deterrent effect of charges is greater than the incentive effect of free eligibility.  
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 In terms of policy implications, the crucial question is not whether charges deter visiting (as all 
the available evidence, including our own, shows that they do), but rather whether charges deter 
necessary, as well as unnecessary, GP visits. Research from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment suggested that increasing levels of charges deter necessary as well as unnecessary 
consultations with primary care doctors, but perhaps paradoxically, there was little impact in 
terms of health status (Keeler, 1992). Unfortunately, we do not have any information on the 
“right” or most appropriate level of GP visiting, from either a medical, social or economic cost-
effectiveness point of view. Information from two recent population surveys provides conflicting 
evidence on the extent to which individuals forego self-perceived “necessary” health 
consultations due to cost. Data from the EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions in 2004 
illustrate that only 1.1 per cent of the population reported that, in the previous year, there was a 
time when they needed a medical examination or treatment for a health problem but did not 
receive it due to cost (with a slightly higher, but still very low, 1.6 per cent of private patients 
foregoing a health consultation due to cost). This would suggest that despite much commentary 
that has highlighted the significant financial burden that GP charges place on private patients, 
particularly private patients on low incomes, charges in Ireland do not appear to deter private 
patients from seeking self-perceived necessary health care. On the other hand, focussing 
specifically on GP consultations, O’Reilly et al., 2006 found that 18.9 per cent of the population 
has medical problem in the previous year but had not consulted their GP because of cost. When 
the population were divided on the basis of eligibility for free GP care, only 4.4 per cent of 
medical card patients were deterred from visiting in the previous year due to cost, in comparison 
with 26.3 per cent of private patients.10  
 
                                                 
10 Indeed, research examining the variation in GP visiting among private patients on different income levels found 
that there was little significant difference in GP visiting moving up the income distribution, except for the probability 
of having at least one GP visit per annum, where the probability was significantly higher for those on higher incomes 
(Nolan and Nolan, 2006).  
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So, are medical card patients, too some extent, visiting their GP unnecessarily, or private patients, 
to some extent, foregoing necessary GP visits, or some combination of both? While the above 
survey evidence provides us with some (conflicting) answers to the second question, it does not 
provide any clarity on the first. Indeed, it is difficult to assess the necessity or otherwise of a GP 
consultation, from either a medical, economic or social point of view. It may be the case that GP 
visits fulfil an important psychological function, in terms of reassurance and advice, which are 
notoriously difficult concepts to quantify. What is clear though, is that there is a significant 
difference in levels of GP visiting between medical card and private patients, and the magnitude 
of the difference is remarkably similar across different estimation methods and data sources.  
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses difference-in-differences matching methods to analyse the impact of free 
eligibility for GP care on the utilisation of GP services in Ireland. Approximately 30 per cent of 
the population (primarily low-income individuals) are entitled to free GP visits (medical card 
patients), while the remainder must pay the full cost (private patients). The purpose of this paper 
was to determine whether this difference in economic incentives leads to differences in GP 
utilisation behaviour between the two groups. As individuals are not randomly assigned to 
treatment (medical card) and control (private) groups, we extended previous research to consider 
the use of techniques from the treatment evaluation literature. In addition, as our data are 
longitudinal, we follow the same individuals through time to analyse the impact of changing 
medical card status on GP visiting rates. The results indicate that the average annual number of 
GP visits increases significantly for those who gain a medical card, and decreases significantly 
for those who lose a medical card, with the magnitude and significance of the effects stronger for 
the latter transition.  
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A key concern in the literature on the impact of charging for health services utilisation is the 
extent to which charges reduce “necessary” as well as “unnecessary” consultations, and how this 
subsequently impacts of the use of more costly secondary care services and health status. While 
our results indicate that losing a medical card prompts an individual to decrease significantly their 
annual number of GP visits, it is unclear whether this includes, to some extent, consultations that 
are medically “necessary”. Additional survey data on the extent to which private patients forgo 
self-perceived “necessary” GP consultations due to cost produces ambiguous results. On the other 
side, we cannot say whether individuals who gain a medical card and increase significantly their 
annual number of GP visits are, to some extent, visiting “unnecessarily”. Indeed, it is difficult to 
quantify the necessity or otherwise of a consultation that primarily takes the form of reassurance 
and advice, rather than what we would typically regard as medical treatment. With the data 
available to use, all we can say is that there is a significant difference in levels of GP visiting 
between medical card and private patients, and the magnitude of the difference is remarkably 
similar across different estimation methods. Ideally, we would like to assess the impact of 
eligibility for free GP care on subsequent use of (more costly) secondary care services and health 





TABLES   
 
Table 1 Treatment and Control Groups (Gaining a Medical Card) 
 Control Treatment 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 
Control (PPPP) Private Private Private Private 
Treatment (PPMM) Private Private Medical card Medical card 
Note:  The outcome variable is the change in GP visiting measured at t=4 and t=2. 
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 Table 2 Treatment and Control Groups (Losing a Medical Card) 
 Control Treatment 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 
Control (MMMM) Medical card Medical card Medical card Medical card 
Treatment (MMPP) Medical card Medical card Private Private 
Note:  The outcome variable is the change in GP visiting measured at t=4 and t=2. 
 
Table 3 Average number of GP visits (Pooled Cross-Section) 
 Control Treatment Outcome  
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 (t=4-t=2) 
Control (PPPP) 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 0.1 
Treatment (PPMM)  3.1 3.7 5.1 4.8 1.1 
      
Control (MMMM) 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.2 0.3 
Treatment (MMPP) 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.2 -1.1 




















Table 4 Probit estimates of the probability of treatment (used in the calculation of the 
propensity scores) 
 (1) 
Gaining a medical card 
(2) 
Losing a medical card 
























































































   
N 9,148 4,337 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** significant at 1 per cent level; ** 
significant at 5 per cent level; * significant at 10 per cent level. 
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Table 5  Difference-in-difference average treatment effects   
  (1)
Gaining a medical card 
(2) 
Losing a medical card 








































   






N Control 8,964 4,102 
N Treatment 184 235 
Notes: *** significant at 1 per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; * significant at 10 per cent level. 
 k refers to the number of nearest neighbour matches involved. 
 δ  refers to the size of the calliper (the default is no restriction). 
All matching is with replacement and on the common support. 
 Where the balancing property is not satisfied, results are presented in parentheses.  
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